The Federal Republic of Germany is a country in which major policy changes have been rare or untypical. It is a long process that policy changes can be planned and implemented. The main reason is the institutional restrictions in Germany’s polity. There are structural constraints on the majority in the legislature and the executive mainly as a reaction to the Weimar Republic. Also, a large number of collective actors and institutions participate in the political process and in policy making in Germany. Among these, the federation (Bund) with the federal government and the political parties on the top, the sixteen semi-autonomous states (Länder), the Bundesrat , the council of representatives of the sixteen state governments, a wide variety of cooperative institutions between the federation and the states, such as planning committees for the joint tasks of the federal government and the state executives, and numerous horizontal networks between the states deserve to be named first.
As Schmidt points out:
“A wide variety of co-governing forces and veto players can result in time-consuming processes of consensus formation and conflict resolution. The multitude of co-governing forces, such as coalition parties in federal government, the powerful state governments, the autonomous central bank, a powerful constitutional court and self-administration bodies in local government, social insurance and higher education, may even generate a highly fragmented and slowly working decision-making process. In the worst case a blockade of the decision-making process cannot be precluded.”1
It can be also claimed, that a consensus requirement in the political structure of Germany gives way to reducement of short term elasticity of the political institutions2.This means that the change of the government from SPD to CDU will not produce major policy changes in the short term and there is to be expected continuity in many political issues.
In this text first I will argue Germany’s political system which leads to “policy immobilization” or “Reformstau”3 under the headings of veto players and Germanys federalism, and than the government under Angela Merkel and its continuity in many political areas until now. Under the light of historical and institutional proofs of continuity It will be argued that Merkel’s politics will not differ much from Schröder’s political approaches in the short term in the areas where policy changes are required.
PART 1- POLITICAL SYSTEM- Reasons of Continuity
Veto Players
How important are the power resources of the federal government in Germany? The answer to this question differs. One school of thought sees an impressive accumulation of political power in the federal government, above all in those political parties which control the government. Others regard the power resources of the federal executive in Germany as moderate at the most. Proponents of this view emphasize the fragmentation of power resulting from federalism. Support for this view comes also from scholars who regard politics in the Federal Republic of Germany as subordinate to the judiciary. Proponents of a fourth view emphasize the economic constraints on policy makers, most notably the momentum of a market economy and the impact of globalization , and point to the limits of national policy solutions imposed by a transnational organisation, such as the European Union. Others argue that one needs to balance the power resources of the federal government against the resources of the many ‘co-governing actors’ and ‘veto players’ in Germany’s polity. In this view , the German federal government is at best ‘semi-sovereign’. Historical and international comparisons indeed reveal a ‘semi sovereign state’4.
In that state the government’s room for manoeuvre has been narrowly circumscribed. Cross-national comparison also shows that the Federal Republic is a state full of co-governors and veto players.5 Compared with other constitutional democracies , an usually large number of veto players and co-governing institutions constrain the steering capacity of the federal government in Germany6. According to Schmidt these constraints include:
1. a parliamentary government as opposed to a presidential system and, hence, a higher vulnerability of the government to parliamentary veto players;
2. coalition government as the most typical form as opposed to a single-party government and, hence, higher costs in consensus formation;
3. high thresholds for changes of the constitution which provide ‘veto points’20 to the opposition party and the upper house( as opposed to a system of government without opposition);
4. extended judicial review including abstract review of the constitutionality of legislative acts (rather than a politicized pattern);
5. advanced minority protection mainly through the constitutionally guaranteed basic rights (in contrast to unconstrained majority rule);
6. delegation of public functions to expert institutions , such as an autonomous Central Bank and institutions for safeguarding a free and competitive market;
7. delegation of public functions to interest associations and self-administrating communities, such as social insurance and autonomous collective bargaining between employers’ and employees’ associations on wages and working conditions;
8. power sharing between the federal government and the state governments;
9. self-administration at the local level and in higher education, such as in the university system;
10. constraints due to the transfer of sovereignity to international organizations, such as NATO and the World Trade Organization , as well as transnational organizations, for example the EU;
11. frequently divergent majorities in the lower and the upper house, largely due to non-synchronized trends in party support in lower house elections and in the parliamentary election in the states;
12. and last but not least the quasi-permanent electoral campaign in Germany which results from the high frequency of national elections and state-level elections of national importance.
The implication of the large number of potentially co-governing actors and veto players in Germany is twofold. First, it strengthens the hybrid character of the Federal Republic which fuses majoritarian and non-majoritarian elements. The non-majoritarian component resides in the numerous co-governing forces and veto points and in the unanimity or near-unanimity required to overcome a veto. Secondly, governing within this context is particularly cumbersome and time-consuming. The leeway for action on the part of the government is relatively small, the cost involved in widening the room for manoeuvre is considerable, and the price to be paid for the consent of all veto players is high. It often includes reduced redistribution, considerable time-lags, and highly fragmented problem solving. Moreover, the window of opportunity for large-scale reforms is often closed and difficult to open. These restrictions do not necessarily imply immobile policy making. But the cost involved in delivering major policy changes tends to be significantly higher than the cost of reform policy making in a state with few veto players and co-governing institutions, other things being equal.
All co-governing forces and veto-players mentioned above are major political actors in the Federal Republic of Germany. 7
Federalism:
Germany deserves that close attention should be paid to its political institutions. Whereas other member states of the European Union except Austria are unitary states Germany is a federalist country.
It is not a country with one government, it is rather “a single country with 17 governments” one in the capital, Berlin, and one in each of the sixteen regional states(Länder).
Decentralization and power sharing rather than concentration of power determines the political system of Germany. Power is also shared vertically between “Bundesregierung” and the government of each of the Lander. Germany’s constitution comprises federalism as a fourth element of the constitutional structures, as opposed to a centralized unitary state. Since unification in 1990, German federalism consists of sixteen states-in contrast to ten states and West Berlin before unification. Germany’s federalism gives major emphasis to the goal of equal economic standards of living and legal rules between the states. Also, the Federal Republic is characterised by the unique profile of a “unitarian federalism”8. Furthermore, Germany’s federalism is charactarized by extensive cooperation and interlocked politics between the federal government and the state governments, as well as by no less extensive horizontal coordination between the states.9
As a result of the federalist order the autonomous room for manoeuvre available to federal government and each of the state governments are narrowly determined. In order to get things done, the federal government and the political parties in parliament upon which is based must cooperate in most policy areas with the states or at least with the majority of the votes in the Bundesrat.
Although their powers may appear limited –their original powers are mainly police ,education,cultural affairs,and loal government- the states play a key role in politics and policy making in Germany10 .It has been even argued that Germany is “ a republic of the states’ princes’11 with the minister-presidents as the republican version of the earlier princes of the states. This mirrors the important role of the states in federal legislation ,their predominance in administration, and the national importance of most elections of state parliaments , but it also reflects the central role of the minister-presidents in Germany’s federalism and in the political parties both at the Land and the federal level.12
The power of states is most visibly institutionalized in the Bundesrat, the collective representation of the states at the federal level. In contrast to US Senate, which consists of elected representatives of the states, the Bundesrat is composed of members of the state governments which appoint and recall deputies. The Bundesrat can thus be regarded as a delegated upper house, a “conclave of states”, and as a bureaucratic council following earlier precedents in German history closely.13
The Bundesrat plays a key role in the policy process. This largely reflects the central position of the upper house in federal legislation, which turns Germany into a case of strong symmetrical bicameralism.14 Legislative change of the constitution requires two-thirds majorities in the lower and upper houses. Thus, the majority of the votes in the Bundesrat can veto a change in the constitution desired by the federal government and the majority of the lower house. The Bundesrat also plays a powerful role in legislation below the level of constitutional change. Besides the case of executive legislation of the federation, such as in foreign policy an protection of the constitutional democracy , federal legislation which directly affects the interest of the states is liable to the consent of the Bundesrat. The Bundesrat,thus, controls a veto point of greatest strategic importance.
And even in the legislation which does not require the consent of the Bundesrat , the upper house possesses a qualified veto.. The Bundesrat can require a reconciliation procedure on controversial legislation regardless of weather its consent is formally required. When the reconciliation procedure has been exhausted, the Bundesrat may still raise an objection to the bill. This objection amounts to a qualified veto. If the veto is based on an absolute majority in the Bundesrat, it can be overcome by an absolute majority in the lower house of parliament, the Bundestag. If the objection is based on a two-thirds majority , the Bundestag can override the objection of the Bundesrat only with a two-thirds majority.15
As it has been explained above dependence on the states in federal legislation constrains the steering capacity of the federal government to a large extent. The federal government often fin itself in a position in which it is not at all sovereign but rather dependent to bargaining and consensus with the majority of the states in the Bundesrat. There are more constraints if rival majorities exist in the Bundestag und Bundesrat. This situation is not rare. Particularly dramatic are periods in which the opposition party in the lower house can count on the majority of the seats in the upper house. This was the case from June 1972 to March 1977 and from June 1978 to 1 October 1982 in the era of the SDP-FDP coalition (1969-1982).
The opposition party also controlled the majority in the Bundesrat in the period from June 1990 to November 1990 and from April 1996 to the end of the Kohl government in October 1998. It is chiefly in these periods that ‘party politicization’16 overrides the Bundesrat’s role of a counterweight to partisan politics. 17
In these circumstances, the federal government and the political parties on which it is based need not only the agreement of the majority of the states executives in order to pass legislation. They also need agreement from states governed or co-governed by the opposition party of the Bundestag .Thus, the governance of the Federal Republic through legislation often requires the formation of a grand coalition of the incumbent parties and the major opposition party as well as a coalition of the federal government and the majority of the state governments. Government in Germany thus often means government together with the opposition- unless the federal government find ways and means to circumwent the power of the opposition party in the Bundesrat, for example by mobilizing support of one or two states governed or co-governed by the Christian Democratic Party.18
Also Cooperation between the federation and the states , sharing power and intertwining of policy making contribute to bridge the vertical and horizontal fragmentation of the decision-making process in Germany through a high level of intergovernmental ‘interweaving’ or Politikverflechtung.19.
As a consequence, the relevant political actors in federal government and in the states find themselves confronted with a wide variety of interdependent decision-making situations.
The interdependence minimizes the possibilities and also the attractiveness of solo runs of one or several of the participants. Interdependent decision-making is rather a powerful incentive for extended bargaining and for compromise –seeking problem solving. Within this context non-majoritarian conflict resolution , such as unanimous decisions or supermajorities, prevails over majoritarian decision rules and precludes hierarchical steering. This may dramatically reduce the manoeuvrability of the federalist order and may strengthen the incentive for maintaining the status quo.20.
PART 2: CONTINUITY ISSUE IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT
In this part, after the arguments about the political system of Germany, which leads to policy stability, I will give shortly some examples of the new government policies and structures, which show continuity characteristics. The reason of this fact is explained through the text in relation to the institutionalist approach in order to explain the political system of Germany. I want to show, that the continuity in many policy areas can be explained with the factors explained in the first part of the text. Because of the institutional constraints there couldn’t be major policy and structure changes and there hadn’t been in the short term in the new government.
Continuity in the structure:
To the question “Who will conduct in the future European politics answered Merkel:
“European politics is conducted always by the president and all people who are responsible in the departments. This diplomatic formal catches all the meaning in the “and”, because the relations between the presidency and the departments are the main problem. It was before the elections clear, that no radical change to a centralisation will occur by the president of the European politics.
The total structure of the distribution of the Europe-political duties in the “Bundesregierung” will be more complex in comparison to the past, it doesn’t exist simplification or concentration. The duties are distributed in a complicated manner between the CDU-directed ‘Bundeskanzleramt’, the SPD directed foreign ministry, the CSU- directed economy ministry and the CDU directed ministry of interior.
Coordination remains the major task in shaping the German politics but it is unpredicted whether the foreign ministry will be more clearly the coordinator or the presidency stays as the gravitations centre. In the newspapers there are to be seen that continuity is to be expected in the Europe and foreign policy areas despite the structural differences between the ministries and chancellorship or perhaps however even because of systematic of checks and balances of the many actors, which will require to coordinate even more diplomatic skills. As it has been seen power is not concentrated on the government but also dispersed among many actors, which has been explained in the first part.
Thus is not enough, Also the Bundestag, also the Lands of the Federal Republic influence on the German European politics, its structural positions in the structure of the actor system plays an important role. The Lands of the Federal Republic fastened their position in two ways, ever strengthened, on the one hand by the voting of the European constitution contract, on the other hand in the context of the agreement, which obtained the federalism reform commission during the coalition negotiations.21
The right of the Länder to participate in EU affairs has been strengthened in both content and formal terms as a result of European integration, which also touches upon Länder domestic competencies. The most important step was the insertion of a "Europe Article" (Art. 23) into the Basic Law on the occasion of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The details of this participation are set out in the Act on Cooperation between the Federation and the Länder in European Union Affairs (EUZBLG) and in the Federation-Länder Agreement (BLV) of 29 October 1993.The Länder participate in EU affairs through the Bundesrat.
The Federal Government informs the Bundesrat fully, and at the earliest possible stage, about all EU proposals which may be of interest to the Länder . In particularly urgent or confidential cases the Bundesrat's Chamber for European Affairs, rather than the regular plenary, will deal with the matter.22
Continuity in Policies:
A high degree of continuity in german european politics due to the election was to be expected if the absence of european topics, the fundemental agreement between the parties over Europa and the few recognizable divergences is to be taken to the yardstick.
From Fisher to Steinmeier: Continuity can be seen also by the
whereabouts of the SPD in the government,particularly since it is guarenteed not by the party , but also by offices and persons. That applies in particular to the new minister of foreign affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who already belonged in Lower Saxony to Gerhard Schröders team and later worked as a chancellorship minister in its government and was in this characteristic responsible for the coherency of the entire policy of the Federal Government, which task brings it certainly as a minister of foreign affairs.
Pacta sunt servanda-Continuity also in the case of the Turkey question: Continuity was also the crucial characteristic of the coalition negotiations, as far as they concern the European politics and settle in the coalition contract. “Pacta sunt servenda” is the rule, which was accepted by Angela Merkel in the areas, on which the earlier positions from each other deviates.
Household, finances, stability pact:
Continuity can be seen also here, anyhow generally the stability pact applies, regarding the medium-term financial plan of the union to the years 2007 to 2013.
“Die deutsche Position war von der Regierung Schröder bereits im Jahr 2003 festgelegt worden…Diese Forderung hatte sich die Opposition schon vor dem Wahlen zu eigen gemacht, im gemeinsamen Widerspruch gegen Europäische Kommission und Europäisches Parlement…Merkel wies darauf hin, dass Regierung und Opposition –„ob Sozialdemokraten oder Christdemokraten- in der Frage der Haushaltsplanung für die Europäische Union „die gleiche Perspektive“ einnähmen und sich hier nicht vorwerfen sollten, was die Europaabgeordneten aller Parteien für weitergehende Pläne entwerfen.”23
NOTES
1 Schmidt, Manfred : Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany, New York 2003, p.4
2 Zohlnhöfer, R.: Die Wirtschaftspolitik der Ära Kohl : Eine Analyse der Schlüsselenntscheidungen in den Politikfeldern Finanzen.Arbeit und Entstaatlichung,Opladen 2001
3 Manfred,Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany, p.6
Literally translated „reform congestion „
4 Katzenstein,P.J.: Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State, Philadelphia 1987.
5 Tsebelis, G.: Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work ,Princeton 2002, p.301 “A veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement ( by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change in policy
6 Schmidt, M. G.: Demokratietheorien, in: Schmidt, Manfred, Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany, New York 2003, p.45
7 Schmidt, Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany, S.46
8 Hesse, K. :Der unitarische Bundesstaat , Karlsruhe 1962
9 Scharpf,F.W., Reissert B.,Schnabel , F.: Politikverflechtung: Theorie and Emprie des kooperativen Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik, Kronberg 1976, S.95
10 Jeffery, C. : Recasting German Federalism: The Legacies of Unification, London 1999,p. 129
11 Steffani, W.: Die Republik der Landesfürsten ,in G.A. Ritter (ed.), Regierung, Bürokratie und Parlament in Preussen und Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1848 bis zur Gegenwart, Düsseldorf 1983, S.199
12 Schneider, H.: Ministerpräsidenten: Profil eines politischen Amtes im deutschen Föderalismus, Opladen 2001,
13 Lehmbruch ,G.: German Federalism and the Challenge of Unification, in J.J. Hesse and V.Wright(eds),Federalising Europe? The Costs, Benefits and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems ,Oxford 2000,169-203
14 Lijphart, A.: Patterns of Democracy : Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven 1999, p.214
15 Schmidt, Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 58
16 Ismayr, W.: Der Deutsche Bundestag im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,Opladen 2000, p.23
17 Lehmbruch, German Federalism and the Challenge of Unification, p.182
18 Schmidt, Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany, p.59
19 Smith, Democracy in Western Germany :Parties and Politics in the Federal Republic, Aldershot 1986,p.51
20 Scharpf,F.W., Reissert B., Schnabel , F.: Politikverflechtung: Theorie and Emprie des kooperativen Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik, S.95
21 Marhold, Hartmut: Deutsche Europapolitik nach dem Regierungswechsel, in: Integration,Nr.1,2006
S.3-15
22Germany’s European Policy – Basic Informations-
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Europa/deutschland-in-europa/entscheidungsfindung.html
23 Marhold, Hartmut: Deutsche Europapolitik nach dem Regierungswechsel,in:Integration,Nr.1, 2006 ,
S.3-15
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hesse, K.: Der unitarische Bundesstaat, Karlsruhe 1962.
Ismayr, W.: Der Deutsche Bundestag im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen 2000.
Jeffery, C. : Recasting German Federalism: The Legacies of Unification, London 1999.
Katzenstein,P.J.: Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State, Philadelphia 1987.
Lehmbruch ,G.: German Federalism and the Challenge of Unification, in J.J. Hesse and V.Wright (eds), Federalising Europe? The Costs, Benefits and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems ,Oxford 2000.
Lijphart, A.: Patterns of Democracy : Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven 1999.
Marhold, Hartmut: Deutsche Europapolitik nach dem Regierungswechsel, in: Integration,Nr:1,2006.
Scharpf,F.W., Reissert B.,Schnabel , F.: Politikverflechtung: Theorie and Emprie des kooperativen Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik, Kronberg 1976.
Schmidt, Manfred : Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany, New York 2003, p.4
Smith, Democracy in Western Germany :Parties and Politics in the Federal Republic, Aldershot 1986.
Schneider, H.: Ministerpräsidenten: Profil eines politischen Amtes im deutschen Föderalismus, Opladen 2001.
Steffani, W.: Die Republik der Landesfürsten ,in G.A. Ritter (ed.), Regierung, Bürokratie und Parlament in Preussen und Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1848 biszur Gegenwart, Düsseldorf 1983.
Tsebelis, G.: Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work ,Princeton 2002.
Zohlnhöfer, R.: Die Wirtschaftspolitik der Ära Kohl : Eine Analyse der Schlüsselenntscheidungen in den Politikfeldern Finanzen. Arbeit und Entstaatlichung, Opladen 2001
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Ýzinsiz Gösteri'de yayýmlanan yazýlar ve görselller izin alýnmadan ya da kaynak gösterilmeden kullanýlamaz
The Federal Republic of Germany is a country in which major policy changes have been rare or untypical. It is a long process that policy changes can be planned and implemented. The main reason is the institutional restrictions in Germany’s polity. There are structural constraints on the majority in the legislature and the executive mainly as a reaction to the Weimar Republic. Also, a large number of collective actors and institutions participate in the political process and in policy making in Germany. Among these, the federation (Bund) with the federal government and the political parties on the top, the sixteen semi-autonomous states (Länder), the Bundesrat , the council of representatives of the sixteen state governments, a wide variety of cooperative institutions between the federation and the states, such as planning committees for the joint tasks of the federal government and the state executives, and numerous horizontal networks between the states deserve to be named first.
